Primakov’s Mideast shuttle has made him the most prominent Soviet diplomat after Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze; some call him Shevardnadze’s heir apparent. The Kremlin’s mediation efforts have improved its position in the Middle East at a time when Soviet prestige is sagging elsewhere. Moscow plays a double game in the gulf. It maintains its improved relationship with Washington by supporting, sincerely enough, the American-led campaign to get Iraqi forces out of Kuwait. But despite Shevardnadze’s concession last week that force might be necessary, Moscow has established its image as a leading advocate of a peaceful settlement. Whether the gulf crisis ends in a compromise or a war, the Kremlin is likely to emerge as one of the big winners.
Last week Secretary of State James Baker talked with Shevardnadze for 13 hours, including two hours at President Mikhail Gorbachev’s dacha outside Moscow. The Americans said Gorbachev was dismayed by Primakov’s lack of success with Saddam. According to Soviet sources, Saddam was willing to consider a compromise settlement, under which he might ultimately obtain two Kuwaiti islands and control over a disputed oilfield. But he was not willing to start the process by completely withdrawing his forces from the emirate, as demanded by the international coalition arrayed against him.
American officials and some Soviet analysts believe Gorbachev has conflicting objectives. He wants a partnership with Washington, but he also wants to make sure that Moscow comes out on the right side of whatever happens in the gulf. Since the crisis began, the Kremlin has kept up relations with Baghdad, deciding to leave thousands of oilfield workers and at least 133 military specialists in Iraq until their work contracts were completed. Moscow also has aggressively courted other countries that can help it, economically or politically, improving its relations with Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Israel.
An academic specialist and former journalist in the Middle East, Primakov, 61, is an influential member of Gorbachev’s Presidential Council. As an Arabist, he represents a bureaucratic mind-set at odds with that of Shevardnadze, for whom the U.S.-Soviet relationship is of paramount importance. “Primakov looks at Saddam, and he sees a longstanding Soviet relationship that he wants to preserve if he possibly can,” says Andrei Kortunov, an analyst at Moscow’s Institute for the U.S.A. and Canada. By allowing Primakov to play a conspicuous role in the crisis, Gorbachev keeps his Arab options open for as long as he can.
Some hard-liners charge that “Gorbachev and Shevardnadze are continually yielding to the West without thinking through the Soviet Union’s long-term interests,” Kortunov says. Gorbachev also has to remember that if he supports a military crackdown on Saddam, he may stir up new unrest in his own Muslim republics. Thus he has to keep his distance from Washington, even if he agrees with U.S. policy. The payoff could be that, once the dust settles, Gorbachev’s “good cop” will be a lot more popular among the Arabs than Bush’s tough enforcer.
